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Abstract
To counter misinformation, regulators can exercise control over the costs that media
outlets incur for misreporting policy-relevant news, e.g. by imposing fines. This
paper analyzes the welfare implications of those type of interventions that affect
misreporting costs. I study a model of strategic communication between an informed
media outlet and an uninformed voter, where the outlet can misreport information
at a cost. The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by
two competing candidates before communication takes place. I find that there is no
clear nexus between the voter’s welfare and informational distortions: interventions
that benefit the voter might be associated with more misreporting activity and
persuasion; relatively low misreporting costs yield full revelation, but minimize
the voter’s welfare because they induce large policy distortions. Interventions that
increase misreporting costs never harm the voter, but lenient measures might be
wasteful. Electoral incentives distort the process of regulation itself, resulting in
sub-optimal interventions that are detrimental to the voter’s welfare.
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1 Introduction
One of the most common criticism leveled against the media is that they strategically
distort news to pursue their private interests and affect political outcomes.1 To counter
the threat posed by the spread of misinformation, most countries enforce laws that punish
the practice of misreporting information. Consider for example the United Kingdom’s
Representation of the People Act 1983 (Chapter 2, Part II, Section 106):
A person who, or any director of any body [...] which – (a) before or during an
election, (b) for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at the election,
makes or publishes any false statement of fact in relation to the candidate’s personal
character or conduct shall be guilty of an illegal practice.
More recently, several governments put forward “fake news laws” to address the growing
concern about distortions of the political process caused by misinformation. Most of these
efforts revolve around the idea of affecting media outlets’ costs of misreporting information
through, e.g., fines and jail terms (Funke & Famini, 2018).2
This class of interventions is relevant not only due to its recent popularity, but also
because it seeks to steer the conduct of media outlets without interfering with the markets’
concentration levels. In “news markets” a single outlet with private possession of some
information is in fact a monopolist over that particular piece of news. This is often the
case with scoops, scandals, and “October surprises.” Since breaking news spread fast,
even small outlets can reach a large audience when endowed with a scoop that can swing
the outcome of an election.3 In these circumstances, interventions that affect the costs
of misreporting information might still discipline the behavior of those media outlets
with exclusive possession of policy-relevant news. Despite its relevance, the regulation of
misreporting costs is currently highly understudied, and to date there is no formal model
exploring its consequences.4
In this paper, I study the welfare effects of interventions that impact on the costs of
misreporting information. The key idea is that the implications of media bias are not
confined to distortions of voters’ choice at the ballot box, but they spread and propagate
back to the process of policy-making. Ahead of elections, competing candidates face a
tension between gathering popular consensus with policies that benefit voters or seeking
1This concern is substantiated by empirical evidence that media bias has an impact on voting behavior
(see, e.g., DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007)) and by the observation that mass media are voters’ primary
source of policy-relevant information (see Gottfried, Barthel, Shearer, and Mitchell (2016)).
2Misreporting costs can be direct, as for the time and money required to tamper evidence; or indirect
and probabilistic, such as the loss of reputation and profits incurred by a media outlet if caught in a lie.
3In the “Killian document controversy,” online blogs’ revelation that CBS aired unauthenticated and
forged documents was quickly rebroadcast by a wide spectrum of media. See Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2008) for this and other examples.
4This is because most related work assumes that misreporting is either costless (e.g., in cheap talk
models) or impossible (e.g. in disclosure models). See Section 2 for a review of the relevant literature.
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the endorsement of influential media with biased policies. Since media bias skews electoral
competition and produces distortions in policy outcomes, the informational and political
effects of regulation need to be jointly determined.
I consider a model of strategic communication between a media outlet and a represen-
tative voter, where the alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed
by two competing candidates running for office. In the policy-making stage, the two
candidates – an incumbent and a challenger – sequentially and publicly make a binding
commitment to policy proposals. Afterwards, in the communication subgame, the media
outlet delivers a public news report about the candidates’ relative quality. Given the
proposals and the outlet’s report, the voter casts a ballot for one of the two candidates.
At the end, the policy proposed by the elected candidate gets implemented.
In contrast with canonical models of strategic communication, the media outlet bears
a cost of misreporting its private information about candidates’ quality that is increasing
in the magnitude of misrepresentation. The voter and the outlet have aligned preferences
over the relative quality of candidates (hereafter just “quality”), but disagree on which
policy is the best. Therefore, when candidates advance different proposals, there are
contingencies in which there is a conflict of interest between the outlet and the voter. An
agency problem emerges, as the outlet can strategically misreport information to induce
the election of its favorite candidate and seize political gains at the expense of the voter.
The main results show how the regulation of misreporting costs affects the voter’s
welfare and provide a number of policy implications. I find that an increase in the costs
of misreporting information never harms the voter, but small increments might have no
effect at all on the voter’s welfare. This result implies that lenient regulatory efforts can
actually make the voter worse off when carrying out interventions is costly. I obtain
conditions under which the voter is better off without media outlet or alternatively with
an “electoral silence” period which forbids the delivery of policy-relevant news ahead of
the election.5 I also show that there is no monotonic relationship between the costs of
misreporting information and the probability that persuasion takes place. Interventions
that increase such costs might yield more misreporting and more persuasion, and yet
improve the voter’s welfare because of the availability of better policies. Therefore, the
growing concern that “proposed anti-fake news laws [...] aggravate the root causes fuelling
the fake news phenomenon” (Alemanno, 2018) is perhaps exaggerated. This also implies
that the empirical task of inferring the efficiency of this kind of interventions from the
media’s reporting behavior is challenging, if not impossible.
A natural question is whether politicians have the right incentives to set forth in-
terventions that benefit the voter.6 To answer this question, I extend the main model
5Some countries operate a pre-election silence period where even polling and campaigning are not
allowed in the days before elections, while in other countries such kind of bans are unconstitutional.
6Most fake news laws are introduced by members of incumbent governments, ministers, or government
factions (Funke & Famini, 2018; The Law Library of Congress, 2019).
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by endogenizing the process of regulation concerning misreporting costs, which takes
place ahead of the policy-making stage. I show that the electoral incentives of politicians
generate a friction in the regulatory process that results in the selection of interventions
that depress the voter’s welfare. The worst scenario is obtained when the incumbent
government is in charge of regulation: in this case, the incumbent sets relatively low
misreporting costs which trigger the convergence of proposals to the media outlet’s favorite
policy. Even though misreporting behavior is fully eradicated, the voter’s welfare is at
its minimum because of the induced policy distortion. From the voter’s perspective, the
resulting political outcome is abysmal, and equivalent to that of a dystopic scenario where
the media outlet has the voting rights to directly decide upon which policy to implement
and which candidate to elect. The situation is better, but still far from ideal, when the
challenger is in charge of regulation.
The intuition behind the results above is as follows. As the costs of misreporting
information decrease, both candidates offer more “biased” policies in the attempt to gather
the endorsement of an increasingly persuasive media outlet. The candidates’ proposals
become progressively closer to each other until, for sufficiently low misreporting costs,
they fully converge to the outlet’s preferred policy. More similar policies imply a smaller
conflict of interest between the voter and the media outlet, and thus persuasion can occur
in a smaller number of contingencies as costs decrease. Eventually, the convergence of
proposals eradicates any conflict of interest as in these cases the only element that can
differentiate candidates is their relative quality, over which preferences are aligned. Almost
paradoxically, with low misreporting costs the media outlet has a high persuasive potential
and yet it fully reveals its private information about quality. However, the voter’s welfare
is at its minimum because perfect knowledge about quality — and thus perfect selection of
candidates — comes at the cost of obtaining a large distortions in terms of policies, which
are the farthest from the voter’s ideal. If candidates’ quality is sufficiently less important
than their policies, then the voter might be better off without media outlet at all.
Since policy convergence occurs for a set of sufficiently low but positive misreporting
costs, lenient interventions might be ineffective. On the other hand, a substantial raise in
the misreporting costs might trigger policy divergence and thus increase the contingencies
in which there is a conflict of interest, making room for more misreporting and persuasion.
In these cases, the voter’s welfare increases because the loss of information about quality
and the increased electoral mistakes are more than compensated by the availability of
better policies. When misreporting costs are sufficiently high, both candidates offer more
“populist” policies to please the voter rather than the weakened media outlet. As costs
increase, the candidates’ proposals tend to converge back toward the voter’s preferred
policy, mitigating the conflict of interest and the occurrence of misreporting and persuasion.
The voter’s welfare is thus maximized for arbitrarily high misreporting costs.
To see how electoral incentives skew the process of regulation, recall that policies
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are proposed sequentially. The presence of an influential media outlet transforms the
policy-making stage in a sort of sequential rock-paper-scissors game where a moderate
policy beats a populist one, a biased policy beats a moderate one, and a populist policy
beats a biased one. Given the incumbent’s proposal, the challenger has the second-mover
advantage to choose the most profitable strategy between seeking the voter’s approval or
the media outlet’s support. When in charge of regulation, the incumbent can annihilate
this “incumbency disadvantage effect” by setting low misreporting costs to force policy
convergence.7 Therefore, electoral incentives push politicians to use regulation for purely
instrumental reasons, decreasing the voter’s welfare as a result.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model, which I solve in Section 4. In Section 5, I
analyze the voter’s welfare and the process of regulation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature studying the political economy of media bias.8
Papers belonging to this literature can be broadly split in two strands: models of demand-
side and models of supply-side media bias. The first strand focuses on the case where
news organizations are profit-maximizing and/or their preferences over political outcomes
are second-order. Bias can emerge, for example, when media firms and journalists want
to develop a reputation for accurate reporting (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro,
2016), when consumers favor confirmatory news (Bernhardt, Krasa, & Polborn, 2008;
Mullainathan & Shleifer, 2005), or because voters demand biased information (Calvert,
1985; Oliveros & Va´rdy, 2015; Suen, 2004). In the present paper I take a supply-side
approach by considering a media outlet that has preferences over political outcomes.
In this second strand, bias originate from the intrinsic preferences and motivations of
agents who work for news organizations like editors and owners. For example, media
bias occurs because journalists have an ideological drive (Baron, 2006), when media firms
suppress unwelcome news (Anderson & McLaren, 2012; Besley & Prat, 2006), or through
a politician’s design of a public signal (Alonso & Camara, 2016).
The above mentioned papers abstract from the process of policy-making and political
competition. By contrast, I explicitly incorporate an electoral stage where candidates
compete via binding commitments to policy proposals. For this reason, the present paper
7Puglisi (2011) and Green-Pedersen, Mortensen, and Thesen (2017) provide empirical evidence of the
incumbency disadvantage effect due to media coverage. However, evidence is mixed as other work finds
that media has either no clear effect (Gentzkow, Shapiro, & Sinkinson, 2011) or a positive effect on the
reelection probability of incumbent politicians (Drago, Nannicini, & Sobbrio, 2014).
8For comprehensive surveys on the topic, see Prat and Stro¨mberg (2013) and Gentzkow, Shapiro, and
Stone (2015).
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is more closely related to the stream of work studying the effects of political endorsements
on policy outcomes. Within this part of the literature but differently than the present
paper, Grossman and Helpman (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), and Chakraborty,
Ghosh, and Roy (2019) consider voters that are uncertain about their own preferences;
Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) model the source of
information about candidates as exogenous; Andina-Dı´az (2006) models voting behavior as
exogenous; Miura (2019) considers a media outlet that delivers fully certifiable information
about candidates’ policies; a demand-side framework is used by Chan and Suen (2008)
and Stro¨mberg (2004); in a political agency framework, Ashworth and Shotts (2010) and
Warren (2012) study how a media outlet affects the incumbent’s incentives to pander.
The most closely related paper is Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016). They use a
Downsian framework to study the welfare effects of a policy-motivated media outlet that
can influence voting behavior via cheap talk endorsements. The present paper is different
in three important aspects: first, I incorporate costs for misreporting information that are
proportional to the magnitude of misrepresentation. Under this approach, a news report is
more than just an endorsement as it constitutes a costly signal of the state (on this point,
see also the next paragraph). Second, I study a sequential rather than a simultaneous
model of electoral competition. As a result, I obtain that the policy of the incumbent is
subject to a different distortion with respect to that of the challenger. I show that this
difference plays an important role when endogenizing the process of regulation. Finally,
the welfare analysis in Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) focuses on the ideological conflict
between the media outlet and the voter, while I focus on the intensity of misreporting
costs and its regulation.
The key feature of the present paper is how communication is modeled. Papers in the
previously mentioned literature consider media outlets that either can report anything
without bearing any direct consequence on their payoffs (e.g., Chakraborty and Ghosh
(2016); Gul and Pesendorfer (2012)) or cannot misreport information at all (e.g., Besley
and Prat (2006); Duggan and Martinelli (2011)). In contrast, I consider a media outlet
that can misreport information but at a cost. In addition to be a realistic feature, this
modeling strategy allows to perform comparative statics on misreporting costs that are
currently unexplored, yet crucial for understanding the regulation of news markets.
Therefore, the present paper also touches upon the literature of strategic communication
with lying costs (Chen, 2011; Kartik, 2009; Kartik, Ottaviani, & Squintani, 2007; Ottaviani
& Squintani, 2006). With respect to this line of work, I consider a setting where the voter
(i.e., the receiver) has a binary action space and the outlet (i.e., the sender) has a continuous
message space. Moreover, the alternatives available to the voter are endogenously selected
through a process of electoral competition, and not exogenously given. This framework
gives rise to a number of important qualitative differences in the amount of information
transmitted and the language used in equilibrium: I obtain equilibria where persuasion
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i c m v
The incumbent com-
mitts to policy qi
The challenger com-
mitts to policy qc
The media outlet privately
observes θ and then
delivers a report r
The voter casts a ballot
b for either the incum-
bent or the challenger
Policy-making stage Communication subgame
Figure 1: Timeline of the model.
naturally occurs even with a large state space; the sender might invest costly resources
to misreport even in absence of a conflict of interest with the receiver; full information
revelation occurs with relatively low misreporting costs.9 These features are key and
instrumental for the main results of the present paper.
3 The Model
There are four players: a representative voter v, a media outlet m, and two candidates: an
incumbent i, and a challenger c. The voter has to cast a ballot b ∈ {i, c} for one of the two
candidates. At the outset, in the “policy-making stage,” each candidate makes a binding
and public commitment to a policy proposal. I assume that proposals are sequential: the
incumbent firstly commits to a policy qi ∈ R; after observing qi, the challenger commits
to a policy qc ∈ R.10 Policy proposals q = (qi, qc) are publicly observable by all players. If
the voter elects candidate j ∈ {i, c}, then policy qj is eventually implemented.
The “communication subgame” takes place after the candidates’ commitments but
before the election: the media outlet privately observes the realization of a state θ ∈ Θ
and then delivers a news report r ∈ R. Reports are literal statements about the state.
Before casting a ballot, the voter observes the report r but not the state θ. Figure 1
illustrates the timing structure of the model.
9With a coarse action space, the outlet can achieve persuasion by pooling information to make the
voter indifferent between two actions. Similarly, Chen (2011) obtains “message clustering” in a setting
with a continuous action space and coarse message space. Kartik (2009) finds partial separation in a
bounded type space setting. Kartik et al. (2007) and Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) show that full
separation is achieved when such bound is arbitrarily large.
10The assumption of sequentiality in the policy-making process reflects that candidates announce their
positions at distinct points in time, and that the incumbent stance over policies is typically formed or
known before the challenger’s. See, e.g., Wiseman (2006).
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The state. The state θ represents the relative quality of the incumbent with respect
to the challenger, and I shall hereafter refer to θ simply as “quality.” I assume that θ is
randomly drawn from a uniform density function f over Θ = [−φ, φ], where f is common-
knowledge to all the players. Only the media outlet privately observes the realized θ. The
voter and the media outlet have identical preferences over quality: given any proposals
q = (qi, qc), the higher is the quality, the better is the perspective of electing the incumbent
rather than the challenger. Thus, quality is an element of vertical differentiation similar
in kind to what is known in political theory as “valence.”11
Payoffs. Candidates are purely office-seeking, and care only their own electoral victory.
I assume that winning the election yields the candidates a utility of 1, while losing gives a
utility of 0. The utility of candidate j ∈ {i, c} is thus uj(b) = 1{b = j}.12
The voter and the media outlet have an ideal bliss policy of, respectively, ϕv ∈ R and
ϕm ∈ R.13 I assume without loss of generality that ϕm < ϕv, and denote with γ > 0 a
parameter weighting the relative importance of policies to quality. The voter’s utility
uv(b, θ, q) from selecting candidate b ∈ {i, c} when quality is θ and proposals are q = (qi, qc)
is an additively separable combination of standard single peaked policy preferences and
quality,
uv(b, θ, q) = −γ(ϕv − qb)2 + 1{b = i}θ.
Therefore, the voter prefers to elect the incumbent if, given proposals q, the relative
quality of the incumbent with respect to the challenger is high enough, θ > τv(q), where
τv(q) = γ(2ϕv − qc − qi)(qc − qi) is obtained from solving uv(i, θ, q) = uv(c, θ, q) for θ.
I similarly define τm(q) = γ(2ϕm − qc − qi)(qc − qi) and refer to τj(q) as player j’s
threshold, for j ∈ {v,m}. The media outlet’s endorsed candidate is
mˆ(θ, q) =

i if θ > τm(q)c otherwise.
I denote with k > 0 a scalar parameter measuring the intensity of misreporting costs, and
with ξ > 0 the outlet’s gains from endorsing the winning candidate. The media outlet gets
a utility of um(r, b, θ, q) when delivering report r in state θ with proposals q and winning
candidate b, where
um(r, b, θ, q) = 1{b = mˆ(θ, q)}ξ − k(r − θ)2.
11Quality can capture traits like candidates’ fit with the state of the world and capability, or might
consist of evidence of their virtues and misconducts. On the closely related notion of valence or character,
see Stokes (1963), Kartik and McAfee (2007) and Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016), among others.
12
1{·} is the indicator function, where 1{A} = 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise.
13The model can allow for the presence of a finite committee or a continuum of voters where v is the
median voter with bliss policy ϕv. Under a majority voting-rule and with two alternatives, the assumption
of sincere voting would be without loss of generality as in those cases truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
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Unlike the voter, the outlet’s utility depends on whether the endorsed candidate mˆ(θ, q) is
elected, but not on the implemented policy qb. This assumption allows to model a media
outlet whose endorsements depend on candidates’ proposals even when such policies do
not directly affect the outlet’s payoff. This is often the case, for example, when editors
and journalists have political leanings on issues such as abortion or gay marriage that
have no direct impact on the media organization itself. The score ξ represents the outlet’s
benefits from endorsing the victorious rather than the defeated candidate.
In addition, the media outlet incurs a cost of k(r − θ)2 for delivering a news report
r when the state is θ. Any report r ∈ R has the literal or exogenous meaning “quality
is equal to r.” Truthful reporting occurs when r = θ, and it is assumed to be costless.
By contrast, misreporting information is costly, and the associated costs are increasing
with the difference between the stated and the true realization of quality. The score k
encapsulates all those elements determining the magnitude of misreporting costs such as
reputation concerns, resources required for tampering evidence and falsifying numbers,
or the stringency of fake-news laws. With some abuse of language, I will hereafter
interchangeably refer to k as “misreporting costs” or “costs’ intensity.”14
Influential News. The media outlet is influential only if the voter’s sequentially
rational decision is not constant along the equilibrium path. To ensure that the outlet is
always influential, I assume that the state space is relatively large, i.e., φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm)2.
Intuitively, a larger state space implies more uncertainty over quality and thus a more
prominent role for an informed outlet. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that
in equilibrium the outlet is influential and that candidates cannot gain from proposing
policies that make the outlet superfluous.15
Strategies and Equilibrium. A strategy for the incumbent is a binding commitment
to a policy proposal qi ∈ R; a strategy for the challenger is a function qc : R→ R which
assigns a policy qc ∈ R to each incumbent’s proposal qi. I assume that candidates cannot
condition their proposals to the state or to the outlet’s reports.16 A reporting strategy
for the media outlet is a function ρ : Θ× R2 → R which associates a news report r ∈ R
to every tuple of proposals q ∈ R2 and quality θ ∈ Θ. I say that a report r is off-path
if, given strategy ρ(·), r will not be observed by the voter. Otherwise, I say that r
is on-path. A belief function for the voter is a mapping p : R → ∆(Θ) which, given
any news report r ∈ R, yields posterior beliefs p(θ|r). Given a report r and posterior
beliefs p(θ|r), the voter casts a ballot for a candidate in the sequentially rational set
β(r, q) = argmaxb∈{i,c} Ep[uv(b, θ, q) | r].
14I use the quadratic loss form k(r − θ)2 to obtain a closed-form solution and to simplify exposition.
To find the equilibria of the communication subgame (Proposition 3 in Appendix A.1), I use a more
general cost function kC(r, θ). For a general framework, see Kartik (2009).
15See Corollary 3 in Appendix A.2.2.
16This assumption is in line with the idea that all uncertainty about quality is publicly resolved only
after policy implementation, and policies cannot be easily changed in the short run. Moreover, candidates
cannot credibly and profitably condition their proposals on the media outlet’s reports.
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The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) refined by Cho and Kreps
(1987)’s Intuitive Criterion.17 For most of the analysis, I focus on the sender-preferred
equilibrium defined as follows: when the voter is indifferent between the two candidates
at a given belief, she selects the one endorsed by the media outlet; when a candidate is
indifferent between some proposals, she advances the policy closest to the outlet’s bliss
ϕm. Given the potential conflict of interest between the voter and the media outlet, the
sender-preferred equilibrium is also the least preferred by the voter. The focus on this type
of equilibrium has two main advantages: first, it provides a useful benchmark consisting
of the voter’s worst case scenario, which is key for the robust control approach to policy
analysis (Hansen & Sargent, 2008); second, it is sufficient to describe how the voter’s set
of equilibrium payoffs changes with the intesity of misreporting costs k.18 I hereafter refer
to a sender-preferred PBE robust to the Intuitive Criterion simply as “equilibrium.”19
4 Equilibrium
I organize the main equilibrium analysis in two parts: in Section 4.1, I begin by solving
for the equilibrium of the final communication subgame where, given any fixed pair of
policies, the media outlet delivers to the voter a news report about the candidates’ quality.
In Section 4.2 I proceed by studying the equilibrium of the policy-making stage, where
candidates sequentially committ to policy proposals. Formal proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2.
4.1 The Communication Subgame
The communication subgame takes place after both candidates commit to policy proposals.
The media outlet privately observes the candidates’ relative quality θ and then delivers a
news report r consisting of a literal statement about θ. The voter, after observing the
outlet’s report but not the quality, casts a ballot for either the incumbent or the challenger.
For convenience, I denote the communication subgame with Γˆ.
Given proposals q, the media outlet has a conflict of interest with the voter when
quality is between the thresholds τj(q), j ∈ {m, v}. Consider for example the case where
policies q are such that τm(q) > τv(q).
20 When θ > τm(q) (resp. θ < τv(q)), the voter and
the outlet both agree that the best candidate is the incumbent (resp. the challenger). By
17For a textbook definition of PBE and Intuitive Criterion, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
18The multiplicity of PBE in the communication subgame (Proposition 3 in Appendix A.1) yields a
convex set W(k) of payoffs that the voter can obtain in equilibrium (Corollary 4 in Appendix A.3). Since
changes in the intensity of misreporting costs k affect only the lower bound of W(k), the focus on the
voter’s worst case scenario is without loss of generality.
19In Appendix A.1, I refer to PBE of the communication subgame that are robust to the Intuitive
Criterion as “generic equilibria” of Γˆ.
20We have that τm(q) > τv(q) when qc < qi, τm(q) < τv(q) when qc > qi, and τm(q) = τv(q) when
qc = qi. In this latter case, there is no conflict of interest between the media outlet and the voter.
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θτm(q)τv(q)
the outlet endorses c the outlet endorses i
the voter prefers c the voter prefers i
conflict of interest
Figure 2: The media outlet and the voter’s favorite candidate for different levels of quality. The
states in which there is a conflict of interest are highlighted in gray.
contrast, when θ ∈ (τv(q), τm(q)) the voter prefers the incumbent while the outlet endorses
the challenger. Since the voter cannot observe the realized quality, she is uncertain on
whether a conflict of interest is in place or not. Figure 2 illustrates the preferred candidate
of the media outlet and the voter across different states and for the case τm(q) > τv(q).
The media outlet can misreport its private information about quality so as to induce
the election of its endorsed candidate mˆ(q, θ) and seize the gains ξ. Denote with Θˆ(q) the
set of states that lie strictly between the thresholds τj(q), j ∈ {m, v}. If the media outlet
delivers a report that yields the election of its endorsed candidate when there is a conflict
of interest, then I say that persuasion has occurred.
Definition 1 (Persuasion). The media outlet persuades the voter if β(ρ(θ), q) = mˆ(θ, q)
for some θ ∈ Θˆ(q) = (min {τv(q), τm(q)} ,max {τv(q), τm(q)}).
Since misreporting is costly, there is a limit to the reports that the outlet can profitably
deliver in a certain state, and thus different reports carry a different informational content
that is not arbitrarily determined by the voter’s strategic inference.21 Consider a news
report r > τm(q), indicating that quality is sufficiently high for the outlet to endorse the
incumbent. Suppose now that r leads to the electoral victory of the outlet’s endorsed
candidate, β(r, q) = i. I define the “lowest misreporting type” l(r) as the highest state θ
in which the outlet does not find it strictly profitable to deliver the news report r.22 More
formally, for some report r > τm(q) such that β(r, q) = i,
l(r) = max
{
r −
√
ξ
k
, τm(q)
}
.
In equilibrium, the voter understands that such report r could not be profitably delivered
if quality is lower than l(r), and should accordingly place probability zero on every θ < l(r).
I similarly define the “highest misreporting type” h(r) as the lowest state in which the
21As it is the case, for example, in cheap talk games.
22In the jargon commonly used in signaling games, the state is also referred to as the “type” of sender.
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outlet does not find it strictly profitable to deliver a news report r < τm(q) such that
β(r, q) = c. Formally,
h(r) = min
{
r +
√
ξ
k
, τm(q)
}
.
I can now present the main result of this section: in the equilibrium of the communi-
cation subgame Γˆ, the media outlet “jams” information by delivering the same pooling
report r∗(q) whenever quality takes values around the voter’s threshold τv(q). Otherwise,
when quality is relatively far from τv(q), the outlet always reports truthfully. When
observing the pooling report r∗(q), the voter ’s expectation about quality is exactly τv(q),
and therefore she is indifferent between the two candidates.23 This result helps to find the
candidates’ equilibrium probability of electoral victory given any pair of proposals q.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium of the communication subgame Γˆ is a pair (ρ(θ), p(θ|r))
such that, given policy proposals q,24
i) If τv(q) < τm(q), then
ρ(θ) =


r∗(q) = max
{
τv(q)− 12
√
ξ
k
, 2τv(q)− τm(q)
}
if θ ∈ (r∗(q), h(r∗(q)))
θ otherwise.
ii) If τv(q) > τm(q), then
ρ(θ) =


r∗(q) = min
{
τv(q) +
1
2
√
ξ
k
, 2τv(q)− τm(q)
}
if θ ∈ (l (r∗(q)) , r∗(q))
θ otherwise.
iii) If τv(q) = τm(q), then ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
iv) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep[θ |r∗(q)] = τv(q), Ep[θ |r] < τv(q) for every off-path r, and p(θ = r|r) = 1
otherwise.
To understand the intuition behind Corollary 1, consider from now on the case where
proposals q are such that τv(q) < τm(q), and suppose that there exists a fully revealing
equilibrium in truthful strategies, where ρ(θ) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ. When quality is slightly
higher than the voter’s threshold τv(q), the media outlet can deliver some report r ≤ τv(q)
such that the incurred misreporting costs are lower than the gains obtained from endorsing
23In the sender-preferred equilibrium, the voter selects the candidate endorsed by the media outlet
when indifferent. Therefore, the voter never mixes.
24Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ) due to the media outlet being indifferent between reporting
l(r∗(q)) and r∗(q) (resp. h(r∗(q)) and r∗(q)) when the state is θ = l(r∗(q)) > τm(q) and τm(q) < τv(q)
(resp. θ = h(r∗(q)) < τm(q) and τm(q) > τv(q)).
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the winning candidate, i.e. k(r− θ)2 < ξ. Given the truthful reporting rule ρ(θ), the voter
takes the outlet’s reports at face value, and thus elects the challenger after observing any
r ≤ τv(q). The outlet has a strictly profitable deviation, implying that in equilibrium
there must be misreporting in some state.
Misreporting is a costly activity, and therefore the media outlet misreports only if
doing so yields the electoral victory of its endorsed candidate mˆ(θ, q). Moreover, if it is
profitable for the outlet to deliver a report r′ < τm(q) when quality is θ
′ ∈ (r′, τm(q)), then
reporting r′ must be profitable for all θ ∈ [r′, θ′]. This suggests that in equilibrium the
outlet “pools” information about quality by delivering the same report r∗(q) for different
states in a convex set S(r∗(q)) such that mˆ(θ′, q) = mˆ(θ′′, q) for all θ′, θ′′ ∈ S(r∗(q)).
Upon observing the pooling report r∗(q), the voter infers that the realized quality is
in the set S(r∗(q)). If the voter’s expectation about quality Ep[θ|r∗(q)] is greater than
her threshold τv(q), then she casts a ballot for the incumbent, otherwise she elects the
challenger. Therefore, by pooling states around τv(q) in a way such that Ep[θ|r∗(q)] ≤ τv(q),
the outlet can induce the election of the challenger even when quality is such that the
voter’s preferred candidate is the incumbent. That is, the outlet can achieve persuasion
by pooling information about quality.
The candidate endorsed by the media outlet is more likely to be elected when the
pooling report r∗(q) makes the voter just indifferent between casting a ballot for the
incumbent and the challenger: pooling reports that induce lower expectations have the
same effect on the voter’s choice but are more expensive to deliver when there is a conflict
of interest. Therefore, in equilibrium the outlet misreports by delivering a pooling report
r∗(q) that jams states around the voter’s threshold in a way such that Ep[θ|r∗(q)] = τv(q).
This kind of pooling prescribes the outlet to misreport even in states where no conflict
of interest is in place. Even though at first it might seem counter-intuitive, this reporting
behavior is consistent with strategic skepticism: the voter, being aware of the media
outlet’s leaning and misreporting technology, demands sufficiently strong evidence that
quality is low enough to elect the challenger. Therefore, when quality is just slightly below
τv(q), the outlet must nevertheless misreport to overcome the voter’s skepticism.
By contrast, thruthful reporting always occurs when quality takes extreme values
that are relatively far from the voter’s threshold τv(q). There are two possibilities in this
circumstance: either a conflict of interest is in place, or the interests of the outlet and
the voter are aligned. In the former case, misreporting is not convenient for the outlet
as it would be prohibitively expensive to deliver a report that yields the election of its
endorsed candidate. In the latter case, the outlet does not need to misreport because the
true realization of quality is a sufficiently discriminating signal for the voter be trustful.
Corollary 1 shows that, given proposals q, the media outlet persuades the voter when
θ ∈ (τv(q), h(r∗(q))) if τv(q) < τm(q) and when θ ∈ (l(r∗(q)), τv(q)) if τv(q) > τm(q). If
τv(q) = τm(q), then there cannot be persuasion since the outlet and the voter always agree
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on which candidate is best. By contrast, I say that the outlet exerts “full persuasion” if
persuasion occurs in every state in which there is a conflict of interest.
Definition 2 (Full persuasion). The media outlet exerts full persuasion if β(ρ(θ), q) =
mˆ(θ, q) for all θ ∈ Θˆ(q).
The media outlet has fully persuasive power if, given policy proposals q, the misreport-
ing costs k are low enough to make persuasion affordable in every state where a conflict
of interest is in place. Formally, there is full persuasion if k ∈
(
0, kˆ(q)
]
, where25
kˆ(q) =
ξ
4γ2(τv(q)− τm(q))2 .
Alternatively, the outlet obtains full persuasion if, for given misreporting costs k, the
proposals qi and qc are sufficiently close to each other. Intuitively, as candidates’ policies
become more similar, the preferences of the voter and the outlet become more aligned,
and the set of states in which there is a conflict of interest becomes smaller. Since the
outlet’s potential gains ξ are fixed, the share of states in which persuasion occurs under
a conflict of interest increases as proposals get closer. If policies are sufficiently similar,
then persuasion occurs every time there is a conflict of interest. Formally, there is full
persuasion when proposals q are such that
(qc − qi)2 ≤ ξ
16γ2(ϕm − ϕv)2k . (1)
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium reporting rule of Corollary 1 for different policies and
misreporting costs. In panel (a), the outlet is more likely to prefer the challenger with
respect to the voter and misreporting costs are relatively high. In this case, the media
outlet discredits the incumbent by delivering a report that “belittles” realizations of quality
around the voter’s threshold τv(q). With this strategy, the outlet achieves persuasion in
those states that are highlighted in light gray. By contrast, truthful reporting occurs despite
a conflict of interest in states that are highlighted in dark gray: in these circumstances,
persuasion is prohibitively expensive because of the relatively high misreporting costs
k > kˆ(q). In states that are highlighted in gray, the outlet spends resources to misreport
information even though no conflict of interest is in place. These “white lies” are the
result of the voter’s skepticism about news reports that are not sufficiently discriminatory.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the equilibrium reporting rule when the outlet is more likely
to prefer the incumbent with respect to the voter and misreporting costs are relatively
low. In this case, the media outlet supports the incumbent by delivering reports that
25The cost threshold kˆ(q) is obtained by setting h(r∗(q)) = τm(q) for τv(q) < τm(q) or l(r
∗(q)) = τm(q)
for τv(q) > τm(q), where r
∗(q) is as defined in Corollary 1.
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“exaggerate” realizations of quality around the voter’s threshold τv(q).
26 Low misreporting
costs allow the outlet to exercise full persuasion and elect its endorsed candidate every
time there is a conflict of interest. As before, states in which the outlet delivers white lies
are highlighted in gray, while states in which the outlet persuades the voter are in light
gray.
θ
ρ(θ)
r∗(q)
h(r∗(q))
τm(q)τv(q)
(a) τv(q) < τm(q) and k > kˆ(q).
θ
ρ(θ)
τm(q) τv(q)
l(r∗(q))
r∗(q)
(b) τv(q) > τm(q) and 0 < k ≤ kˆ(q).
Figure 3: The two panels illustrate the equilibrium reporting rule for different levels of mis-
reporting costs and ordering of policy proposals. The states in which persuasion occurs are
highlighted in light gray. In gray, the states where the outlet misreports even though there is no
conflict of interest. States where the outlet reveals the true realization of quality even though
there is a conflict of interest are highlighted in dark gray.
4.2 The Policy-making Stage
Consider now the policy-making stage, where candidates sequentially make a binding
commitment to a policy proposal. Since candidates are purely office-seeking, they advance
policies to maximize their chances to get elected. The result in the previous section is key
for finding the candidates’ equilibrium proposals: Corollary 1 shows the media outlet’s
equilibrium reporting rule and thus pins down the candidates’ probability of electoral
victory given any pair of policies q.
I denote with q∗i (k) the equilibrium policy advanced by the incumbent and with q
∗
c (qi, k)
the challenger’s best response to some proposal qi. I refer to policies that are relatively
close to the voter’s bliss ϕv as “populist” and to policies that are relatively close to
the outlet’s bliss ϕm as “biased.” The next result establishes the equilibrium proposals
q∗(k) = (q∗i (k), q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k), k)) as a function of the misreporting costs’ intensity k.
26There are Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the communication subgame Γˆ where the outlet supports
the incumbent (resp. challenger) by delivering a report that is lower (resp. higher) than the actual
realization of quality. These equilibria do not survive the Intuitive Criterion test.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium policy proposals for different intensities of misreporting costs. As k grows
arbitrarily large, both proposals monotonically converge to ϕv.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium policies q∗(k) are
q∗i (k) =


ϕv +
√
ξ/k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
− 4
√
ξ
γ2k
if k > k¯
ϕv+ϕm
2
−
√
ξ/k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
if k ∈ (k¯/4, k¯]
ϕm if k ∈
(
0, k¯/4
]
q∗c (q
∗
i (k), k) =

ϕv −
4
√
ξ
γ2k
if k > k¯
ϕm if k ∈
(
0, k¯
]
where the misreporting costs threshold is k¯ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
.
In equilibrium, proposals are weakly increasing in k and strictly increasing for every
finite k > k¯ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
.27 When the costs of misreporting information are relatively
low, i.e. for k ∈ (0, k¯/4], both candidates advance the media outlet’s bliss policy ϕm.
Thus, variations of k within the region
(
0, k¯/4
]
leave the equilibrium policies unaltered.
For intermediate costs, k ∈ (k¯/4, k¯], the incumbent sets forth increasingly moderate
proposals q∗i (k) ∈
(
ϕm,
ϕv+ϕm
2
)
, while the challenger keeps offering the outlet’s bliss ϕm.
Thus, an increase of k in the region
(
k¯/4, k¯
)
yields policy divergence. When the costs of
misreporting are relatively high, k > k¯, also the challenger offers less biased policies. As k
grows arbitrarily large, both proposals converge toward the voter’s preferred policy ϕv,
with q∗i (k) > q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k), k) for every finite k > k¯/4.
28 Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium
policy proposals for different levels of misreporting costs’ intensity k.
27The threshold k¯ is the highest costs’ intensity such that the challenger best responds with ϕm when
undercutting the incumbent’s proposal.
28Equilibrium proposals are continuous in k as limk→k¯+ q
∗
i (k) = limk→k¯− q
∗
i (k) and limk→k¯/4 q
∗
i (k) =
limk→k¯/4 q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k), k) = ϕm.
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Here I discuss the intuition behind Proposition 1. Since policies outside the set [ϕm, ϕv]
are always dominated, I restrict attention to qj ∈ [ϕm, ϕv], j ∈ {i, c}.29 First, consider the
challenger’s problem of best responding to the incumbent’s proposal. When the incumbent
sets forth a relatively populist policy, the challenger’s best response is to “undercut” the
incumbent with the most biased proposal qc < qi that grants the media outlet with fully
persuasive power.30 With this strategy, the challenger maximizes both the extent of the
conflict of interest (τm(q), τv(q)) and the probability of receiving the outlet’s support,
subject to the outlet exerting full persuasion. Even though the challenger’s best response
is less appealing to the voter, the loss in “popular appeal” is more than compensated by
the outlet’s ability to persuade the voter over a large set of contingencies. By contrast,
offering a more populist policy qc > qi would make the challenger slightly more appealing
to the voter at the expense of getting the incumbent into the good graces of a fully
persuasive media outlet. Thus, offering any qc > qi is not convenient in this case.
When the incumbent proposes relatively biased policies and misreporting costs are
sufficiently high, the best response of the challenger is to offer the voter’s bliss ϕv. This
strategy generates a large conflict of interest Θˆ(q) = (τm(q), τv(q)) such that the voter
requires evidence that quality is exceptionally high in order to elect the incumbent. The
outlet is now more likely to endorse the incumbent than the challenger but, because of
high misreporting costs and a large policy divergence, it cannot exert full persuasion.
In this case, proposing the voter’s bliss ϕv is the best response because it leaves the
incumbent with an unpopular policy and the support of a weakened media outlet.
By contrast, when the incumbent’s policy is relatively biased but misreporting costs are
sufficiently low, the challenger’s best response remains that of undercutting the incumbent.
The strategy of proposing the voter’s bliss now backfires because with a low costs’ intensity
the media outlet retains its ability to persuade the voter in a relatively large share of Θˆ(q).
If the costs’ intensity k is low enough, then the challenger’s best response is to undercut
the proposal of the incumbent to the point of offering the outlet’s bliss ϕm. Figure 5
shows the challenger’s best response for different intensities of misreporting costs.31
Consider now the incumbent’s problem of selecting a policy that maximizes its prob-
ability of electoral victory, and suppose first that the intensity of misreporting costs is
relatively high, k > k¯/4. In this case, the optimal proposal of the incumbent q∗i (k) is
the policy that makes the challenger indifferent between best replying with the voter’s
bliss or with a relatively more biased policy (i.e., by undercutting the incumbent): higher
proposals qi > q
∗
i (k) would allow the challenger to get the support of a fully persuasive
outlet; lower proposals qi < q
∗
i (k) would be highly unpopular in comparison with the
29The focus on policies within the set [ϕm, ϕv] is without loss of generality: for both candidates
j ∈ {i, c}, proposals qj > ϕv (resp. qj < ϕm) are dominated by every q′j ∈ [ϕv, qj) (resp. q′j ∈ (qj , ϕm])
as any such q′j is more appealing to both the voter and the outlet.
30Formally, the challenger offers the lowest proposal that satisfies condition (1) with equality.
31Proposition 4 in Appendix A.2.1 shows the challenger’s best response function.
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qi
q∗c (qi, k)
ϕm
ϕm
ϕv
ϕv
Figure 5: The challenger’s best response for different intensities of misreporting costs. The best
response is depicted in black for relatively high costs, k > k¯; in dashed light gray for intermediate
costs, k ∈ (k¯/4, k¯); in dark gray, for relatively low costs, k ∈ (0, k¯/4].
challenger’s best response of offering the voter’s bliss. By contrast, when the intensity of
misreporting costs is relatively low, k ∈ (0, k¯/4), the media outlet exerts full persuasion
for any combination of candidates’ proposals q ∈ [ϕm, ϕv]2. In this case, the incumbent’s
optimal policy is to offer the outlet’s bliss, as any higher proposal qi > ϕm would allow
the challenger to get the support of a fully persuasive media outlet by undercutting qi.
32
The presence of a persuasive media outlet generates a distortion in the process of
policy-making. Since candidates look to gain both the consensus of the voter and the
support of the influential outlet, their proposals drift away from the voter’s preferred
policy, breaking down the centripetal force of the Median Voter Theorem (Black, 1948;
Downs, 1957). This distortion peaks when the intensity of misreporting costs is sufficiently
low that both candidates advance the media outlet’s bliss policy. In these case, persuasion
never takes place since when candidates’ proposals are identical there is no conflict of
interest (see Corollary 1). Therefore, with lower (resp. higher) intensities of misreporting
costs the voter might have worse (resp. better) policies but more (resp. less) information
about quality. In the next section, I study this trade-off in relation to the voter’s welfare.
5 Welfare and Regulation
Having characterized the equilibrium of the communication subgame (Corollary 1 in
Section 4.1) and the candidates’ equilibrium proposals (Proposition 1 in Section 4.2),
I now proceed by studying their welfare implications. I denote with W ∗v (k) the voter’s
32Notice that the model does not predict that the incumbent always takes a relatively more populist
position with respect to the challenger. While this happens in the sender-preferred equilibrium, there are
other equilibria where the challenger goes fully populist by offering the voter’s favorite policy and the
incumbent proposes a relatively more biased policy. See Proposition 4.
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equilibrium expected utility and refer to W ∗v (k) simply as the voter’s welfare.
33 As a
benchmark, consider the voter’s expected utility under complete information, which I
denote with Wˆv. Suppose that the voter perfectly observes the realized quality after the
policy-making stage but before the election takes place. In this case, both candidates
cannot do better than offering the voter’s bliss policy as the media outlet would have no
role. The candidate with the highest relative quality is always elected and the voter’s
favorite policy is always implemented. Therefore, Wˆv = φ/4.
In Section 5.1, I study how the intensity of misreporting costs affect different de-
terminants of the voter’s welfare. In Section 5.2, I extend the main model by allowing
candidates to select the costs’ intensity ahead of the policy-making stage. Formal proofs
are relegated to Appendix A.3.
5.1 The Voter’s Welfare
Consider the problem of a regulator that seeks to maximize the welfare of the voter by
selecting the intensity of misreporting costs. This type of intervention can be performed,
for example, by issuing “fake news laws” or by subsidizing watchdogs that expose to
the public those media outlets that concoct news reports. As we have seen in the
previous section, the process of policy-making is strategically intertwined with the voter’s
informational environment. Interventions that change the misreporting costs might affect
both the amount of information received by the voter and the policies advanced by the
candidates.34 To maximize the voter’s welfare, it is crucial for regulators to understand
the consequences and the trade-offs involved with this type of interventions.
Before showing the next result, it is thus useful to remark some important features of
the equilibria in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. First, equilibrium policies q∗(k) satisfy
condition (1) for every finite k: on the equilibrium path, the media outlet always exerts
full persuasion and the candidate endorsed by the outlet, mˆ(q∗(k), θ), is always elected.
Figure 6 shows the outlet’s reporting rule on the equilibrium path for some finite k > k¯/4.
Second, an increase in the misreporting costs’ intensity does not necessarily yield more
information to the voter. Intuitively, since the outlet exerts full persuasion, the larger
the conflict of interest Θˆ(q∗(k)), the less the information received by the voter. Recall
that the share of states in which there is a conflict of interest is directly proportional
to the difference between proposals.35 It follows that an increase in k brings more (resp.
less) information to the voter only if it generates policy convergence (resp. divergence).
However, Proposition 1 shows that the distance between equilibrium proposals is non-
33See equation (4) in Appendix A.3 for an explicit formulation of W ∗v (k).
34The voter receives more (resp. less) information if, given the outlet’s reporting rule ρ(·), she elects
her preferred candidate with higher (resp. lower) probability.
35Formally, |Θˆ (q∗(k)) | = 2γ(ϕv − ϕm) (q∗i (k)− q∗c (q∗i (k), k)).
19
θρ(θ)
τm(q∗(k))τv(q∗(k))
r∗(q∗(k))
h(r∗(q∗(k)))
Figure 6: The media outlet’s reporting rule on the equilibrium path for some finite costs’ intensity
k > k¯/4. The outlet exerts full persuasion and its endorsed candidate is always elected.
monotonic in k.36 Hence, an increase in the misreporting costs’ intensity might as well
decrease the amount of information received by the voter in equilibrium. Third, with
relatively low costs’ intensities, k ∈ (0, k¯/4), there is no conflict of interest because
equilibrium policies are identical. In this case, persuasion never occurs and the media
outlet fully reveals its private information about quality. By contrast, persuasion always
takes place with positive probability for every finite k > k¯/4. Therefore, in equilibrium
there is persuasion only if the misreporting costs’ intensity is sufficiently high.
Since an increase in the misreporting costs might yield the voter better policies at the
expense of selecting the best candidate with lower probability, it is not clear how this
type of intervention would affect the voter’s welfare. The next proposition clears this
ambiguity by showing that increments in the costs’ intensity k never harm the voter.
Proposition 2. The voter’s equilibrium welfare W ∗v (k) is independent of k for all k ∈(
0, k¯/4
)
, and strictly increasing in k for all finite k ≥ k¯/4. As k →∞, W ∗v (k)→ Wˆv.
Proposition 2 shows that even in those cases where an increase in k yields more
persuasion, the gain that the voter obtains from having better policies always overcomes
the expected loss in quality due to worse selection. Denote with χ(k) the ex-ante probability
that persuasion occurs, or “persuasion rate.” From Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we
have that on the equilibrium path the rate of persuasion is χ(k) = τm(q
∗(k))−τv(q∗(k))
2φ
. As
observed before, the media outlet is more likely to persuade the voter when the set of
states in which there is a conflict of interest Θˆ(q∗(k)) is larger. Figure 7 shows both the
voter’s welfare and the probability that persuasion occurs as a function of k.
The policy/information trade-off occurs when k ∈ [k¯/4, k¯): in this case, a marginal
increase in the cost intensity k generates policy divergence, more disagreement, and thus
36A marginal increment in k yields policy convergence for all finite k > k¯, policy divergence for all
k ∈ (k¯/4, k¯), and has no effect on policies for all k ∈ (0, k¯/4).
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(a) The voter’s equilibrium welfare.
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(b) The probability of persuasion in equilibrium.
Figure 7: The voter’s welfare increases with the intensity of misreporting costs even in those
cases where persuasion is more likely to take place. With relatively low intensities of misreporting
costs there is no persuasion but the voter’s welfare is at its minimum. As k grows arbitrarily
large, W ∗v (k) and χ(k) converge monotonically to, respectively, Wˆv = φ/4 and zero.
a higher persuasion rate χ(k). As a consequence, the voter becomes increasingly likely
to elect the wrong candidate. The expected loss in quality due to worse selection is
more than compensated by the availability of an increasingly populist policy advanced
by the incumbent: since the proposals of both candidates are heavily skewed toward
the media outlet’s preferred policy, the voter obtains an exceptionally high gain from
implementing policies that, on average, are closer to her bliss. When k ≥ k¯, an increase
in the costs’ intensity generates proposals that are both more populist and closer to each
other. The resulting policy convergence reduces the conflict of interest, and thus the
persuasion rate χ(k) declines. In this case, the welfare of the voter increases because she
obtains better policies and makes a better selection of candidates. By contrast, when
k ∈ (0, k¯/4), a marginal increase in the costs’ intensity have no effect on equilibrium
policies and thus does not impact the voter’s welfare either. As a result, lenient measures
can actually decrease the voter’s welfare when accounting for the resources required to
carry out interventions.
The media outlet provides the voter with useful information about candidates’ quality,
but on the other hand it generates a policy distortion where proposals drift away from the
voter’s bliss. This trade-off reaches its peak when the intensity of misreporting costs is
relatively low: the media outlet fully reveals its private information about quality but the
proposal of both candidates collapse to the outlet’s preferred policy. If the quality of the
elected candidate has little importance with respect to the implemented policy, then the
voter might be better off without media outlet: in this case, both candidates would pander
to the uninformed voter by offering her preferred policy, and the voter would randomly
elect one of the two candidates. The next result shows conditions under which the voter
is better off without media outlet.
Corollary 2. If −γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4 < 0, then there exists a finite k′ > k¯/4 such that
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the voter is strictly better off without media outlet for all k ∈ (0, k′).
Alternatively, the voter might be better off with a “pre-election silence” period which
forbids the delivery of policy-relevant news ahead of the election.37 Conditional on the
intensity of misreporting costs being low enough, the voter is better off without media
outlet if: (i) γ is high enough, so that policies are much more important than quality; (ii)
the preferred policy of the voter and the outlet are different enough, i.e. there is a large
ideological difference |ϕv − ϕm|; (iii) φ is small enough, that is, quality has little impact
on which candidate is best. By contrast, if the costs’ intensity is high enough, then the
presence of the media outlet always benefits the voter. Corollary 2 is complimentary to
similar findings in Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) for a cheap talk setting, Alonso and
Camara (2016) in a bayesian persuasion framework, and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015)
for a non-strategic and exogenous media outlet.
5.2 Endogenous Regulation
In the previous section, Proposition 2 suggests that a regulator concerned about the
voter’s welfare should implement an intensity of misreporting costs that is as high as
possible. However, regulation is often performed by actors that are neither fully detached
from the political process nor have interests that are perfectly aligned with that of voters.
In fact, “fake news laws” are mostly promulgated and discussed in parliaments, where the
incumbent government has substantial decisive and legislative power.38 I first discuss the
case where the incumbent candidate selects the intensity of misreporting costs.
Consider the following extension of the main model: ahead of the policy-making stage,
the incumbent sets forth a costs’ intensity ki > 0, which is publicly observed and cannot
be changed in the short run. Then, the game proceeds as described in Section 3. The
incumbent, being purely office motivated, selects ki to maximize its chances of electoral
victory. From the previous analysis, we obtain that in equilibrium the incumbent wins
the election with probability ι(k) = φ−τm(q
∗(k))
2φ
. I denote with k∗i the costs’ intensity that
maximizes ι(k). The next result shows that the incumbent candidate would select a costs’
intensity that is relatively low.
Lemma 1. The incumbent sets forth a k∗i ∈
(
0, k¯/4
]
, where ι (k∗i ) =
1
2
= limk→∞ ι(k).
To see the intuition behind this result, recall that the sequential nature of the policy-
making process allows the challenger to offer policies that are more appealing to the media
outlet with respect to those offered by the incumbent (Proposition 1). By obtaining the
outlet’s support, the challenger enjoys a second-mover advantage as it becomes more likely
37Several countries operate an “election silence” period where no campaigning, polling, or endorsement
of candidates is allowed in the period preceding a general or presidential election.
38Funke and Famini (2018) provide a comprehensive list of measures recently taken by governments
against online misinformation.
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to be elected than the incumbent.39 Figure 8 shows that the incumbent’s probability of
electoral victory is less than a half for all finite k > k¯/4. Lemma 1 shows that, when in
charge of regulation, the incumbent eliminates the challenger’s second-mover advantage
by setting relatively low misreporting costs to force policy-convergence: when candidates
advance the same policy, the media outlet never engages in misreporting, and thus the
challenger cannot benefit from the outlet’s support. Any higher intensity of misreporting
costs would generate policy divergence and thus a conflict of interest that would benefit
the challenger at the expense of the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory.
Lemma 1 casts a negative perspective over the process of regulation. From the voter’s
viewpoint, the incumbent could not select a worse costs’ intensity: even though k∗i is
such that misreporting and persuasion never take place, the induced policy distortion is
maximized and the voter’s welfare is at its minimum. The resulting outcome is as if the
media outlet could directly decide upon which candidate gets elected and which policy
is implemented. Moreover, for such low costs’ intensity k∗i the voter might be better off
without media outlet at all (Corollary 2). The situation is be better, but still far from ideal,
when the challenger is in charge of selecting the costs’ intensity: in this case, the challenger
maximizes her chances of electoral victory by selecting k∗c = argmink∈R+ ι(k) > k¯. This
level of costs’ intensity generates policy divergence and thus a positive persuasion rate
χ(k). However, the voter is better off with k∗c than with k
∗
i because of a reduction in
policy distortion. As long as candidates have an influence over the regulatory process,
their office motivation results in a pull for implementing costs’ intensities that are lower
than the voter’s ideal.
Lemma 1 also shows that the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory gets close to
a half for arbitrarily large costs’ intensities. By selecting a k∗i ∈
(
0, k¯/4
]
, the incumbent
deliberately compromises the voter’s welfare to increase its chances of winning just by an
arbitrarily small amount. This strategy is arguably unappealing to voters, and it would
be fair to assume that such behavior might eventually backfire with a substantial drop of
consensus. On the other hand, interventions that impose arbitrarily high misreporting
costs might be frowned upon if their implementation costs are large or when such stringency
is perceived as a potential threat to the freedom of speech. To incorporate these realistic
elements in the present analysis, consider the following alternative extension: the voter has
a preferred costs’ intensity kv that is relatively large but finite, kv ≥ k∗c ; the incumbent’s
probability of electoral victory is ιˆ(ki) = ι(ki) + ν(ki), where ν(·) indicates how the
incumbent’s choice of ki affects its chances of winning the election. Suppose that ν(·) is
maximized for ki = kv, continuously differentiable in ki, and ν(k
′) > ν(k′′) for all k′, k′′
such that |kv − k′| < |kv − k′′|. For concreteness, say that ν(ki) = y + x · φ(ki; kv, σ),
39The incumbency disadvantage effect that is behind the result in Lemma 1 is present also in equilibria
that are non sender-preferred. By definition, ι(k) is the same even when the challenger does not break
indifference in favor of the media outlet.
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Figure 8: The incumbent’s probability of electoral victory for different choices of costs’ intensity.
The black line represents ι(k), while the dashed and dotted lines represent ιˆ(k) = ι(k) + ν(k),
where ν(k) = −.006 + .2 · φ(k; kv, σ). In the dotted line, φ(·) has a standard deviation of σ = 6
and ιˆ(k) has a global maximum at k∗ ≈ 10.5 > kv = 10; in the dashed line, φ(·) has a standard
deviation of σ = 8 and ιˆ(k) has a global maximum at k∗ ≈ k¯/4 = .25 As the intensity of
misreporting costs k grows arbitrarily large, ι(k) monotonically converges to 1/2.
where y ∈ R, x > 0, and φ(k; kv, σ) is the probability density function of a normal
distribution with mean kv and standard deviation σ.
40 Even though I do not endogenize
the mechanism through which the candidates’ probability of victory is affected by the
process of regulation, this alternative extension can offer some additional insights. When
the choice of ki does not affect much the incumbent’s chances of victory (i.e., when x is low
and σ is high), the incumbent selects k∗i ≈ k¯/4 as in the baseline extension; otherwise, the
incumbent’s optimal choice is even higher than the costs’ intensity preferred by the voter,
i.e., k∗i > kv.
41 Figure 8 provides two graphical examples of this additional extension.
The above analysis suggests that if an electorate is highly concerned and responsive to
the problem of “fake news,” then incumbent governments might push for extreme and
disproportionate interventions; otherwise, regulation might be overly lenient. This result
seems to fit with the dual reaction to recent efforts made by governments against fake
news and misinformation. In some countries there is a growing feeling that governments’
efforts are insufficient. With regards to the US, “Calls for regulation without censorship
have been made by many people and many groups — it’s just that there is simply no
political will to make an real change” (Applebaum, 2018). On the other hand, there
is a concurrent concern that some interventions are excessively stringent and can be
exploited by governments for purely instrumental reasons. For example, the 2018 French
40Clearly, parameters y, x, and σ must respect ιˆ(ki) ∈ [0, 1] for every ki > 0.
41In this last case we obtain that k∗i > kv because
∂ν(ki)
∂ki
∣∣
k=kv
= 0 and ∂ι(ki)∂ki > 0 for all ki > kv ≥ k∗c .
When setting a costs’ intensity that is marginally higher than kv, the incumbent increases its chances
of victory by inducing more similar policies and therefore less conflict of interest and persuasion. For a
similar reason, in this case the challenger would select a costs’ intensity that is still lower than kv.
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anti-misinformation law endorsed by President Macron has received a pushback from
the opposition party based on the argument that the law falls short of the principle of
proportional justice. “As regards the French solution, there seems to be a clear risk
that an incumbent government constrains the freedom of expression of its opponents”
(Alemanno, 2018). Similarly, the German Network Enforcement Act (or NetzDG) has
been criticized by Reporters without Borders and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Opinion for damaging the right to freedom of the press and endangering human rights.
The Act, which imposes fines up to e50 million, has been considered for revision because
too much content was blocked. “Even the minister of justice – who helped author the
NetzDG – had his tweets censored” (Funke & Famini, 2018).
6 Conclusion
This article studies the voter’s welfare in relation to interventions that affect media outlets’
misreporting costs. The results provide a number of policy implications. As intuition
would suggest, interventions that increase the costs of misreporting information never
make the voter worse off. However, lenient regulatory efforts might be futile and thus
wasteful when accounting for their implementation costs. In these cases, a regulator should
either do nothing or enforce substantial measures. I provide conditions under which the
voter is better off without media outlet or with a period of pre-election silence.
The presence of an influential and biased media outlet generates both policy and
informational distortions. As a result, higher misreporting costs might be associated
with more persuasion and a worse selection of candidates, but they can still increase
the voter’s welfare because of a reduction in policy distortions. Therefore, regulatory
efforts such as “fake news laws” ought not to be judged solely by their impact on
misreporting behavior. This type of interventions should not be designed with the
objective of reducing or eliminating misinformation: full revelation can be achieved with
relatively low misreporting costs, but the induced policy distortion would minimize the
voter’s welfare.
Importantly, electoral incentives skew the process of regulation as politicians strategi-
cally choose interventions to maximize their own chances of electoral victory. For purely
instrumental reasons, the incumbent government deliberately sets forth interventions that
minimize the voter’s welfare. These kind of frictions in the regulatory process persists
even when the challenger is in charge of regulation and when the candidates’ probability
of electoral victory is affected by which intervention they choose to advance.
To study the regulation of misreporting costs, I implicitly assume that it is possible to
publicly verify the media outlet’s private information (at least with some probability).
Therefore, there is no additional agency problem between the voter and the regulator.
This is a first important step toward the development of a sensible theory of regulation in
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news markets. I show that the process of regulation is problematic even when politicians
have the option to implement an “ideal intervention” that maximizes the voter’s welfare
at no cost and without generating an agency problem. However, as discussed at the end
of Section 5, there is a widespread concern that fake news laws might infringe free speech
rights. It is often difficult to publicly assess and agree upon what is the underlying “truth”
behind news reports, thus governments can use harsh interventions to capture the media.42
Drawing from this paper’s findings, the next step is to incorporate the threefold conflict
of interest between politicians, media outlets, and voters. I leave this for future research.
42At the end of Section 5, I incorporate the idea that voters have a distaste for harsh interventions,
e.g. because of excessive implementation costs. Alternatively, voters might be afraid that the government
can exploit regulation to control information. However, I do not explicitly model the agency problem
between the politicians and the voter, and take for exogenous the process through which the candidates’
probability of electoral victory is affected by their choice of regulation.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Communication Subgame
The communication subgame Γˆ starts after the policy-making stage, where both candidates
make binding commitment to policy proposals. In this section, I assume that the proposed
policies q = (qi, qc) are such that τm(q) < τv(q). Since policies are fixed, in this section
I simplify the notation by using τj ≡ τj(q) and β(r) ≡ β(r, q). I use the term “generic
equilibrium” to denote a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the communication subgame
Γˆ that is robust to Cho and Kreps (1987)’s Intuitive Criterion. A “sender preferred
equilibrium” of the communication subgame Γˆ is the generic equilibrium preferred by the
media outlet as defined in Section 3.
Proposition 3 builds on Lemmata 2 to 6 and shows all the generic equilibria of Γˆ.43
The proofs of Proposition 3 and of all its supporting lemmata are performed for a general
misreporting cost function kC(r, θ), where k > 0 and C(·, ·) is continuous on R×Θ with
C(r, θ) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R and θ ∈ Θ, C(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Θ. The cost function C(·)
satisfies C(r, θ) > C(r′, θ) if |r − θ| > |r′ − θ| for all θ ∈ Θ, and C(r, θ) > C(r, θ′) if
|r − θ| > |r − θ′| for all r ∈ R. I redefine the functions l(r) and h(r) for a general cost
C(r, θ) as follows: for a r > τm, l(r) = max {τm,min {θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ}}; for a r < τm,
h(r) = min {τm,max {θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ}}. To preserve consistency with the rest of the paper,
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 are expressed in terms of the cost function C(r, θ) = (r−θ)2.
I define the set of all the voter’s pure strategy best responses to a report r and posterior
beliefs p(·|r) such that p(T |r) = 1 as,44
B(T, r) =
⋃
p:p(T |r)=1
argmax
b∈{i,c}
∫
θ∈Θ
p(θ|r)uv(b, θ, q)dθ.
Fix an equilibrium outcome and let u∗m(θ) denote the outlet’s expected equilibrium payoff
in state θ. The set of states for which delivering report r is not equilibrium dominated for
the outlet is
J(r) =
{
θ ∈ Θ
∣∣∣u∗m(θ) ≤ max
b∈B(Θ,r)
um(r, b, θ, q)
}
.
An equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion refinement if there exists a state
θ′ ∈ Θ such that, for some report r′, u∗m(θ′) < minb∈B(J(r′),θ′) um(r′, b, θ′, q).
In Lemma 6, I use the following notation to denote the limits of the reporting rule ρ(·)
as θ approaches state t from, respectively, above and below: ρ+(t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and
ρ−(t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
43A sufficient condition on the state space for the existence of all generic equilibria in Proposition 3 is,
for proposals q such that τv(q) > τm(q), φ ≥ max
{
τv(q) +
√
ξ/k,−τm(q)
}
. In this section I assume that
such condition is always satisfied.
44For T = ∅, I set B(∅, r) = B(Θ, r).
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Lemma 2. In a generic equilibrium of Γˆ, ρ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ < τm and θ > τm.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that there are two states θ′′ > θ′ > τm
such that ρ(θ′) > ρ(θ′′). We can rule out that β(ρ(θ′)) = β(ρ(θ′′)) = c, as in such case the
equilibrium would prescribe ρ(θ′) = θ′ < θ′′ = ρ(θ′′). If β(ρ(θ′)) = β(ρ(θ′′)) = i, then in at
least one of the two states θ′, θ′′ the outlet could profitably deviate by delivering the report
prescribed in the other state. Consider the case where β(ρ(θ′)) = i (c) and β(ρ(θ′′)) = c
(i). In equilibrium, it has to be that ρ(θ′′) = θ′′ (ρ(θ′) = θ′). Given ρ(θ′) > ρ(θ′′) = θ′′ > θ′
(θ′′ > θ′ = ρ(θ′) > ρ(θ′′)) and C(ρ(θ′), θ′′) < C(ρ(θ′), θ′) (C(ρ(θ′′), θ′′) > C(ρ(θ′′), θ′)),
the outlet could profitably deviate in state θ′′ (θ′) by reporting ρ(θ′) (ρ(θ′′)). A similar
argument applies for any two states θ′ < θ′′ < τm, completing the proof.
Lemma 3. In a generic equilibrium of Γˆ, if ρ(θ) is strictly monotonic and continuous in
an open interval, then ρ(θ) = θ for all θ in such interval.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that the reporting rule ρ(·) is strictly
increasing (decreasing) and continuous in an open interval (a, b), but ρ(θ) > θ for some
θ ∈ (a, b). There always exist an ǫ > 0 such that the media outlet prefers the same
alternative in both states θ and θ− ǫ, and θ < ρ(θ− ǫ) < ρ(θ) (resp. ρ(θ− ǫ) > ρ(θ) > θ).
The media outlet never pays misreporting costs to implement its least preferred alternative,
therefore it must be that β(ρ(θ)) = β(ρ(θ − ǫ)). Since C(ρ(θ − ǫ), θ) < C(ρ(θ), θ) (resp.
C(ρ(θ), θ − ǫ) < C(ρ(θ − ǫ), θ − ǫ)), the media outlet has a profitable deviation in state θ
(resp. θ − ǫ), contradicting that ρ(·) is in equilibrium.
Lemma 4. In a generic equilibrium of Γˆ, ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τm.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that ρ(θ) 6= θ for all θ ∈ S, where S is
an open set such that supS ≤ τm and S ⊂ Θ. Beliefs must be such that β(r) = i for all
r ∈ S. Suppose that a report r′ ∈ S is off-path. It must be that u∗m(θ) ≥ um(r′, i, θ, q)
for all θ ≥ τm. Since sup J(r′) ≤ τm < τv and B(J(r′), r′) = c, the outlet can profitably
deviate by reporting truthfully when θ = r′ ∈ S. Hence, all reports r ∈ S must be on-path.
To have β(r′) = i for a r′ ∈ S, it must be that ρ(θ′) = r′ for some θ′ ≥ τv. In all states
θ > τm such that ρ(θ) ∈ S, the outlet must deliver the same least expensive report r′ ∈ S
such that β(r′) = i. Thus, S has measure zero and ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τm.
Lemma 5. In a generic equilibrium of Γˆ, ρ(·) is discontinuous at some θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a generic equilibrium where ρ(θ) is
continuous in Θ. From Lemma 4, we know that ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ τm. If ρ(θ) = θ also
for all θ > τm, then the equilibrium would be fully revealing. In such case, the outlet
could profitably deviate by reporting τv when the state is θ ∈ (τv − ǫ, τv) for some ǫ > 0.
Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ′) 6= θ′ for some state θ′ > τm. By Lemma 3, it has to
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be that ρ(θ′) < θ′, otherwise ρ(·) would be discontinuous; Lemmata 2 and 3 imply that
ρ(θ) = ρ(θ′) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ(θ′), τm}, supΘ). There always exists a report r′ ≥ θ′
such that inf J(r′) ≥ max{ρ(θ′), τm}. Since β(ρ(θ′)) = i, it must be that B(J(r′), r′) = i.
Therefore, there are states where the media outlet would have a profitable deviation,
contradicting that a continuous ρ(·) can be part of a generic equilibrium.
Lemma 6. In a generic equilibrium of Γˆ, ρ(·) has a unique discontinuity in state θδ,
where θδ ∈ [τm, τv]. The reporting rule is such that ρ(θ) = ρ+(θδ) > θδ = l(ρ+(θδ)) for
θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)) and ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ (inf Θ, θδ) ∪ [ρ+(θδ), supΘ).45
Proof. I denote with θδ the lowest state in which a discontinuity of ρ(·) occurs. From
Lemmata 4 and 5, we know that in equilibrium such discontinuity exists and θδ ≥ τm.
Suppose that ρ−(θδ) 6= θδ. If ρ−(θδ) < θδ, then by Lemmata 2 and 3 we have that
ρ(θ) = ρ−(θδ) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ−(θδ), τm}, θδ) and ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ max{ρ−(θδ), τm}.
In equilibrium, it has to be that β(ρ−(θδ)) = i and β(r
′) = c for every off-path r′ ∈
(max{ρ−(θδ), τm}, θδ). Hence, every report r′ ∈ (max{ρ−(θδ), τm}, θδ) is equilibrium
dominated for all θ < θ′, where θ′ = {θ ∈ Θ |C(ρ−(θδ), θ) = C(r′, θ)}. Therefore,
B(J(r′), r′) = i, and the media outlet could profitably deviate by reporting r′ instead
of ρ−(θδ) when θ ∈ (θ′, θδ). Suppose now that ρ−(θδ) > θδ. From Lemma 2 we have
ρ−(τm) = τm, thus it has to be that θδ > τm. Similarly to the previous case, in equilibrium
it must be that ρ(θ) = ρ−(θδ) for all θ ∈ (τm, θδ). This is in contradiction with θδ being
the lowest discontinuity, as we would have ρ+(τm) > τm. Therefore, in every generic
equilibrium, ρ−(θδ) = θδ ≥ τm and ρ(θ) = θ for θ < θδ.
From Lemmata 2 and 3, it follows that ρ+(θδ) > θδ and ρ(θ) = ρ
+(θδ) for every
θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)]: since it must be that β(ρ+(θδ)) = i, the outlet would profitably deviate
by reporting ρ+(θδ) in every state θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)] such that ρ(θ) > ρ+(θδ). To prevent
other profitable deviations, ρ+(θδ) must be such that ξ ≤ kC(ρ+(θδ), θ) for θ ∈ (τm, θδ)
and ξ ≥ kC(ρ+(θδ), θ) for all θ ∈ [θδ, ρ+(θδ)]. Together, these conditions imply that
θδ = l(ρ
+(θδ)). Every off-path report r
′ > ρ+(θδ), if any, would be equilibrium dominated
by all θ ≤ ρ+(θδ), yielding B(J(r′), r′) = i. Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ) = θ for all
θ ≥ ρ+(θδ), and ρ(θ) = ρ+(θδ) for θ ∈ (θδ, ρ+(θδ)).
Suppose now that θδ > τv. Given the reporting rule, beliefs p must be such that
p(θ = r|r) = 1 for all r ∈ [τv, θδ). In this case, there always exists an ǫ > 0 such that
the outlet can profitably deviate by reporting τv instead of θ in states θ ∈ (τv − ǫ, τv).
Therefore, θδ ∈ [τm, τv].
Proposition 3. A pair (ρ(θ), p(θ | r)) is a generic equilibrium of Γˆ if and only if, for a
given λ ∈
[
τv, τv +
1
2
√
ξ
k
]
,
45Remember that ρ+(t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and ρ
−(t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
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i) The reporting rule ρ(θ) is, for a λ ∈
[
τv, τv +
1
2
√
ξ
k
)
,46
ρ(θ) =


rˆ(λ) = min
{
λ+ 1
2
√
ξ
k
, 2λ− τm
}
if θ ∈ (l (rˆ(λ)) , rˆ(λ))
θ otherwise.
When λ = τv +
1
2
√
ξ
k
, ρ(θ) = rˆ(λ) for θ ∈ [l(rˆ(λ)), rˆ(λ)), and ρ(θ) = θ otherwise;
ii) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep[θ |rˆ(λ)] = λ, Ep[θ |r] < τv for every off-path r, and p(θ = r|r) = 1 otherwise.
Proof. Given the reporting rule ρ(·) described in Lemma 6, beliefs p must be such that
β(ρ+(θδ)) = i, and thus Ep[θ | ρ+(θδ)] = ρ
+(θδ)+θδ
2
≥ τv. With square loss misreport-
ing costs C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2, we have that l(ρ+(θδ)) = max
{
ρ+(θδ)−
√
ξ
k
, τm
}
≤ τv.
Since θδ = l(ρ
+(θδ)) ≤ τv, we also obtain that Ep[θ | ρ+(θδ)] ≤ τv + 12
√
ξ
k
. Therefore,
the expectation Ep[θ | ρ+(θδ)] induced by the report ρ+(θδ) has to be between τv and
τv +
1
2
√
ξ
k
. Similarly, for a general misreporting cost function C(r, θ), the expectation
Ep[θ | ρ+(θδ)] has to be between τv and τv+r¯(τv)2 , where r¯(θ) is defined for a θ > τm as
r¯(θ) = max {r ∈ R|kC(r, θ) = ξ}. I define the pooling report rˆ(λ) as
rˆ(λ) := {r ∈ R | Ef [θ | l(r) < θ < r] = λ} .
For a λ ∈
[
τv,
τv+r¯(τv)
2
)
, we can rewrite the reporting rule described in Lemma 6 as
ρ(θ) =

rˆ(λ) if θ ∈ (l (rˆ(λ)) , rˆ(λ))θ otherwise. (2)
Alternatively, (2) can have ρ(l(rˆ(λ)) = rˆ(λ) as long as l(rˆ(λ)) > τm. If λ =
τv+r¯(τv)
2
, then
it must be that (2) has ρ(l(rˆ(λ))) = rˆ(λ), otherwise the outlet would profitably deviate
by reporting τv when the state is θ ∈ (τv − ǫ, τv + ǫ) for some ǫ > 0. Since θ ∼ U , when
C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 we have rˆ(λ) = λ+ 1
2
√
ξ
k
if l(rˆ(λ)) > τm and rˆ(λ) = 2λ− τm otherwise.
By applying Bayes’ rule to (2), we obtain that posterior beliefs p are such that
Ep[θ | rˆ(λ)] = λ ∈
[
τv,
τv+r¯(τv)
2
]
and p(θ = r|r) = 1 for all r /∈ [l (rˆ (λ)) , rˆ (λ)). For every off-
path report r′ ∈ (l (rˆ (λ)) , rˆ (λ)) it must be that Ep[θ | r′] < τv to have β(r′) = c. These off-
path beliefs are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion since for every r′ ∈ (l (rˆ (λ)) , rˆ (λ))
we have that inf J(r′) < l(rˆ(λ)) ≤ τv, and thus c ∈ B(J(r′), r′). The proof is completed by
46Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ) due to the media outlet being indifferent between reporting
l(r∗(λ)) and r∗(λ) when the state is θ = l(r∗(λ)) > τm.
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the observation that the pair (ρ(θ), p(θ|r)) described in Proposition 3 is indeed a generic
equilibrium of Γˆ for every λ ∈
[
τv,
τv+r¯(τv)
2
]
.
Proof of Corollary 1. For the case τm < τv, Proposition 3 shows that there is a contin-
uum of generic equilibria of Γˆ parameterized by the expectation λ = E[θ|rˆ(λ)]. Given costs
C(r, θ) = (r− θ)2, λ ∈
[
τv, τv +
1
2
√
ξ
k
]
, and τm < τv, in a generic equilibrium there is per-
suasion when θ ∈ (l(rˆ(λ)), τv). Therefore, λ = τv maximizes the media outlet’s expected
equilibrium payoff: for every λ ∈
(
τv, τv +
1
2
√
ξ
k
]
, if l(rˆ(τv)) > τm, then l(rˆ(λ)) > l(rˆ(τv));
if l(rˆ(τv)) = τm, then l(rˆ(λ)) ≥ τm and rˆ(λ) > rˆ(τv). That is, in the generic equilibrium
where λ = τv the media outlet is either more likely to persuade the voter at the same
expected cost, or is at least equally likely to persuade the voter at a strictly lower cost
compared to generic equilibria where λ > τv. The sender-preferred equilibrium reporting
rule ρ(·) and beliefs p follow from Proposition 3 where the case τm > τv is obtained in a
similar way as τm < τv, and the case τm = τv follows by setting τm → τv in the generic
equilibrium of Proposition 3 where λ = τv.
A.2 The Policy-making Stage
A.2.1 The Challenger’s Best Response
Given the equilibrium of the communication subgame Γˆ (see Corollary 1) and a policy
proposal by the incumbent qi, the expected utility of the challenger is Vc(q) = l(r
∗(q)) if
τm(q) < τv(q), and Vc(q) = h(r
∗(q)) if τm(q) > τv(q). We have that τm(q) = τv(q) only if
qc = qi; in this case, the challenger ensures its electoral victory half the time by mimicking
the incumbent’s proposal, and Vc(q) = 0. By contrast, τv(q) > τm(q) when qc > qi, and
τv(q) < τm(q) otherwise. I define the “best response to the left” BR
L
c (qi) as the best
response of the challenger to policy qi subject to the constraint that qc ≤ qi, that is,
BRLc (qi) = argmaxqc≤qi Vc(q). The “best response to the right” is similarly defined as
BRRc (qi) = argmaxqc≥qi Vc(q).
Step 1. The challenger’s “best response to the left” BRLc (qi) is,
BRLc (qi) =


qi if qi ≤ ϕm
ϕm if qi ∈
[
ϕm, ϕm +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
]
q˜c(qi) = qi −
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
if qi ∈
[
ϕm +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
, ϕv +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
]
ϕv if qi ≥ ϕv +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
Proof. Given qc < qi and the equilibrium in Corollary 1, the challenger wins when θ <
h(r∗(q)), where h(r∗(q)) = min
{
r∗(q) +
√
ξ
k
, τm(q)
}
and r∗(q) = max
{
τv(q)− 12
√
ξ
k
, 2τv(q)− τm(q)
}
.
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When h(r∗(q)) < τm(q) the pooling report is r
∗(q) = τv(q) − 12
√
ξ
k
, thus ∂h(r
∗(q))
∂qc
=
2γ(ϕv − qc) > 0 and ∂τm(q)∂qc = 2γ(ϕm − qc) < 0 for all qc ∈ [ϕm, ϕv]. Thus, the expected
utility of the challenger Vc(q) = h(r
∗(q)) is maximized, subject to qc < qi, when qc is such
that h(r∗(q)) = τm(q). This last equality is satisfied when qc = q˜c(qi), where
q˜c(qi) = qi −
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm) . (3)
Therefore, as long as q˜c(qi) ∈ [ϕm, ϕv], BRLc (qi) = q˜c(qi). Since policies qj /∈ [ϕm, ϕv],
j ∈ {i, c}, are never optimal, it follows that if q˜c(qi) < ϕm ≤ qi, then BRLc (qi) = ϕm; if
qi < ϕm, then BR
L
c (qi) = qi; if q˜c(qi) > ϕv, then BR
L
c (qi) = ϕv. The proof is completed
by solving for these inequalities.
Step 2. The challenger’s “best response from the right” BRRc (qi) is,
BRRc (qi) =


ϕv if qi < ϕv −
√
1
2γ
√
ξ
k
qi otherwise.
Proof. Given qc > qi and the equilibrium in Corollary 1, the challenger wins the election
when θ < l(r∗(q)). Since ∂l(r
∗(q))
∂qc
= ∂h(r
∗(q))
∂qc
, we can proceed as in Step 1: the policy qc such
that l(r∗(q)) = τm(q) minimizes Vc(q) subject to qc ≥ qi, and thus BRRc (qi) = ϕv as long as
l(r∗(qi, ϕv)) > 0. Otherwise, the challenger would be better off by imitating the incumbent
with qc = qi, ensuring itself a payoff of Vc(q) = 0. The condition l(r
∗(qi, ϕv)) > 0 is
satisfied by qi < ϕv −
√
1
2γ
√
ξ/k, completing the proof.
Proposition 4. The challenger’s best response BRc(qi) to a policy qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv] is,
BRc(qi) =


ϕv if qi ∈
[
ϕm, ϕv + η(k)− 4
√
ξ
γ2k
]
and k ≥ k¯
qi − η(k) if qi ∈
[
ϕv + η(k)− 4
√
ξ
γ2k
, ϕv
]
and k ≥ k¯
ϕv if qi ∈
[
ϕm,
ϕv+ϕm
2
− η(k)] and k ∈ (0, k¯]
ϕm if qi ∈
[
ϕv+ϕm
2
− η(k), ϕm + η(k)
]
and k ∈ (0, k¯]
qi − η(k) if qi ∈ [ϕm + η(k), ϕv] and k ∈
(
0, k¯
]
where η(k) =
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
and k¯ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
.
Proof. Given a policy qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv] and best responses BRLc (qi), BRRc (qi) as in Steps 1 and
2, we have that
∂Vc(qi,BRRc (qi))
∂qi
≤ 0 ≤ ∂Vc(qi,BR
L
c (qi))
∂qi
. Therefore, if there is a q′i ∈ [ϕm, ϕv]
such that Vc
(
q′i, BR
R
c (q
′
i)
)
= Vc
(
q′i, BR
L
c (q
′
i)
)
, then BRc(qi) = BR
R
c (qi) for all qi ∈ [ϕm, q′i]
and BRc(qi) = BR
L
c (qi) for all qi ∈ [q′i, ϕv]. As a first step, I compare Vc (qi, q˜c(qi)) and
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Vc (qi, ϕv). When qc < qi and (qc − qi)2 ≤ ξ16γ2k(ϕm−ϕv)2 , we have that h(r∗(qi, qc)) =
τm(qi, qc), and therefore Vc (qi, q˜c(qi)) = τm(qi, q˜c(qi)) and Vc (qi, ϕv) = l(r
∗(qi, ϕv)) =
γ(ϕv − qi)2− 12
√
ξ
k
. The challenger’s expected utility from “best replying to the left” with
q˜c(qi) is
Vc (qi, q˜c(qi)) =
1
2
√
ξ
k
− γ

2(ϕv − qi) +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm)


√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm) .
Thus, the condition τm(qi, q˜c(qi)) = l(r
∗(qi, ϕv)) can be rewritten as
γ(ϕv − qi)2 + 2γ
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm)(ϕv − qi) + γ


√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm)


2
−
√
ξ
k
= 0.
By solving a quadratic equation in (ϕv − qi), I obtain that the threshold q¯′ such that
Vc
(
q¯′, BRRc (q¯
′)
)
= Vc
(
q¯′, BRLc (q¯
′)
)
is,
q¯′ = ϕv +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm) −
4
√
ξ
γ2k
.
Since Vc(qi, qi) = 0, I do not need to consider the case where BR
R
c (qi) = qi as the
challenger can always get a positive expected utility Vc(qi, q
′
c) = γ(q
′
c − qi)2 ≥ 0 by
proposing q′c = max{ϕm, q˜c(qi)}. Since BRLc (qi) = ϕm when q˜c(qi) < ϕm and qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv],
the comparison between Vc(qi, q˜c(qi)) and Vc(qi, ϕv) makes sense as long as q˜c(qi) ≥ ϕm
for all qi ∈ [q¯′, ϕv]. Given that ∂q˜c(qi)∂qi = 1, the condition is q˜c(q¯′) ≥ ϕm or k ≥ k¯, where
k¯ =
ξ
γ2(ϕv − ϕm)4 .
If k ∈ (0, k¯), then we have that q˜c(qi) < ϕm and thus BRLc (qi) = ϕm for some qi ≥ q¯′. In
this case, the relevant comparison is between Vc(qi, ϕm) = τm(qi, ϕm) and Vc(qi, ϕv): by
equating τm(qi, ϕm) = l(r
∗(qi, ϕv)) we get that the threshold is
q¯′′ =
ϕv + ϕm
2
−
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm) .
Note that q¯′ = q¯′′ = ϕm +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
when k = k¯. Therefore, when k ∈ (0, k¯) we have
that BRc(qi) = ϕv for all qi ∈ [ϕm, q¯′′] and BRc(qi) = BRLc (qi) for qi ∈ [q¯′′, ϕv]. Moreover,
BRLc (qi) = q˜c(qi) as long as q˜c(qi) ≥ ϕm, and BRLc (qi) = ϕm otherwise. We have that
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q˜c(qi) ≥ ϕm when qi ≥ q¯′′′, where
q¯′′′ = ϕm +
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm) .
The Proposition follows by replacing η(k) =
√
ξ
k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
.
A.2.2 Equilibrium Policy-making
Proof of Proposition 1. I denote with Vˆi(qi) ≡ Vi(qi, BRc(qi)) the utility of the incum-
bent given that qi ∈ [ϕm, ϕv] and qc = BRc(qi), where the challenger’s best response
BRc(qi) is according to Proposition 4. Since an equilibrium is a sender-preferred PBE, when
the challenger is indifferent between some policies, she selects the policy that is closer to
the media outlet’s bliss ϕm. Given that h(r
∗(qi, qc)) = τm(qi, qc) for qc = max{ϕm, q˜c(qi)},
we have that
Vˆi(qi) =


−l(r∗(qi, ϕv)) if qi ∈
[
ϕm, ϕv + η(k)− 4
√
ξ
γ2k
)
and k ≥ k¯
−τm(qi, q˜c(qi)) if qi ∈
[
ϕv + η(k)− 4
√
ξ
γ2k
, ϕv
]
and k ≥ k¯
−l(r∗(qi, ϕv)) if qi ∈
[
ϕm,
ϕv+ϕm
2
− η(k)) and k ∈ (0, k¯]
−τm(qi, ϕm) if qi ∈
[
ϕv+ϕm
2
− η(k), ϕm + η(k)
]
and k ∈ (0, k¯]
−τm(qi, q˜c(qi)) if qi ∈ [ϕm + η(k), ϕv] and k ∈
(
0, k¯
]
where η(k) =
√
ξ/k
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
and k¯ = ξ
γ2(ϕv−ϕm)4
. Henceforth, I will use the following notation:
q¯′ = ϕv + η(k)− 4
√
ξ
γ2k
, q¯′′ = ϕv+ϕm
2
− η(k), and q¯′′′ = ϕm + η(k).
When k ≥ k¯, the utility Vˆi(qi) is increasing in qi until qi = q¯′, and decreasing afterwards,
as ∂Vˆi(qi)
∂qi
= 2γ(ϕv − qi) > 0 for qi ∈ [ϕm, q¯′] and ∂Vˆi(qi)∂qi = 2γ(ϕm − qi) < 0 for qi ∈ [q¯′, ϕv].
Since −l(r∗(q¯′, ϕv)) = −τm(qi, q˜c(qi)), it follows that qi = q¯′ maximizes Vˆi(qi) for k ≥ k¯.
The challenger replies to qi = q¯
′ with the sender-preferred policy qc = q˜c(q¯
′).
There are three different configurations to consider when the misreporting costs are
lower than k¯: (i) when k¯
4
≤ k < k¯, the relevant thresholds are contained within the bliss
policies of the voter and the media outlet, ϕm ≤ q¯′′ < q¯′′′ < ϕv; (ii) when k¯16 ≤ k < k¯4 , the
threshold q¯′′ is lower than the media outlet’s bliss ϕm, and we have q¯
′′ < ϕm < q¯
′′′ ≤ ϕv;
(iii) when 0 < k < k¯
16
, both thresholds are beyond the bliss policies, q¯′′ < ϕm < ϕv < q¯
′′′.
In the first case, where k ∈ [k¯/4, k¯), we have that ∂Vˆi(qi)
∂qi
= ∂−l(r
∗(qi,ϕv))
∂qi
= 2γ(ϕv−qi) >
0 for qi ∈ [ϕm, q¯′′]; ∂Vˆi(qi)∂qi =
∂−τm(qi,ϕm)
∂qi
= 2γ(ϕm − qi) < 0 for qi ∈ [q¯′′, q¯′′′]; and ∂Vˆi(qi)∂qi =
∂−h(r∗(qi,q˜c(qi)))
∂qi
= −
√
ξ/k
2(ϕv−ϕm)
< 0 for qi ∈ [q¯′′′, ϕv]. Since −l(r∗(q¯′′, ϕv)) = −τm(q¯′′, ϕm)
and −h(r∗(qi, q˜c(qi))) = −τm(q¯′′′, ϕm), we have that when k ∈
[
k¯/4, k¯
)
the incumbent
maximizes Vˆi(qi) by selecting qi = q¯
′′, and the challenger best responds to q¯′′ by proposing
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the sender-preferred policy qc = ϕm.
The same line of reasoning can be extended to the other two cases: when k¯
16
≤ k < k¯
4
,
the incumbent proposes qi = q¯
′′ and the challenger replies with qc = ϕm; when 0 < k <
k¯
16
,
both the incumbent and the challenger propose qj = ϕm, j ∈ {i, c}. The Proposition
follows by denoting q∗i (k) = argmaxqi∈R Vˆi(qi) and q
∗
c (qi, k) = minBRc(qi).
Corollary 3. The equilibrium in Proposition 1 exists if and only if,
φ ≥ min
{
γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + 12
√
ξ/k, 3γ(ϕv − ϕm)2
}
.
Proof. Consider the sender-preferred equilibrium of Γˆ in Corollary 1 and the equilibrium
policies in Proposition 1. When k ∈ (0, k¯/4], we have that q∗(k) = (ϕm, ϕm). Suppose that
the challenger deviates from the prescribed equilibrium strategy by proposing qc = ϕv. If
φ < r∗(ϕm, ϕv), then there is no report that can convince the voter to cast a ballot for the
incumbent, and the deviation would be profitable. Therefore, to ensure the existence of an
equilibrium as in Proposition 1, it is necessary that φ ≥ r∗(ϕm, ϕv). Given that for q such
that qj ∈ [ϕm, ϕv], j ∈ {i, c}, τv(q) is maximized when qi = ϕm and qc = ϕv, the condition
is also sufficient. The proof is completed by τv(ϕm, ϕv) = γ(ϕv−ϕm)2 = −τm(ϕm, ϕv).
A.3 Voter’s Welfare
To ease notation, in this section I will use q∗c (q
∗
i (k), k) ≡ q∗c (q∗i (k)).
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium policies q∗(k) are such
that q∗i (k) ≥ q∗c (q∗i (k)) for every k > 0. Moreover, since (q∗c (q∗i (k))− q∗i (k))2 ≤ ξ16γ2k(ϕm−ϕv)2 ,
we have that h(r∗(q∗(k))) = τm(q
∗(k)) for every k > 0. Given the equilibrium of the
communication subgame Γˆ (Proposition 3 and Corollary 1) and that θ ∼ U [−φ, φ],
the incumbent wins with ex-ante probability φ−τm(q
∗(k))
2φ
. When electing the incumbent,
the voter receives an expected utility of −γ(ϕv − q∗i (k))2 + Ef [θ|θ > τm(q∗(k))], where
Ef [θ|θ > τm(q∗(k))] = φ+τm(q
∗(k))
2
. When electing the challenger, the voter obtains a utility
of −γ(ϕv − q∗c (q∗i (k)))2. Therefore, the voter’s equilibrium welfare can be written as
W ∗v (k) =
(
τm(q
∗(k)) + φ
2φ
)[−γ(ϕv − q∗c (q∗i (k)))2]
+
(
φ− τm(q∗(k))
2φ
)[
−γ(ϕv − q∗i (k))2 +
φ+ τm(q
∗(k))
2
]
.
(4)
When k ∈ (0, k¯/4), since τm(q) = 0 for q = (ϕm, ϕm), equation (4) reduces to
W ∗v (k) = −γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4. Therefore, the voter’s equilibrium welfare W ∗v (k) is
independent of k for all k ∈ (0, k¯/4).
Consider now the case where k ∈ [k¯/4, k¯]. The derivative of the voter’s welfare with
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respect to the misreporting costs k is
∂W ∗v (k)
∂k
=
(
φ− τm( q∗(k))
2φ
)[
1
2
∂τm(q
∗(k))
∂k
− ∂τv(q
∗(k))
∂k
]
−
(
1
2φ
∂τm(q
∗(k))
∂k
)[
φ+ τm(q
∗(k))
2
− τv(q∗(k))
]
.
(5)
For k ∈ [k¯/4, k¯], we obtain the following derivatives: ∂q∗i (k)
∂k
= 1
4γ(ϕv−ϕm)
1
2
√
ξ
k
ξ
k2
> 0,
∂τm(q∗(k))
∂k
= 2γ(q∗i (k)−ϕm)∂q
∗
i (k)
∂k
> 0, and ∂τv(q
∗(k))
∂k
= −2γ(ϕv−q∗i (k))∂q
∗
i (k)
∂k
< 0. Moreover,
notice that τv(q
∗(k)) − τm(q∗(k)) = 2γ(ϕm − q∗i (k))(ϕv − ϕm) and τm(q∗(k)) = γ(ϕm −
q∗i (k))
2. Therefore, I can rewrite equation (5) as
∂W ∗v (k)
∂k
=
γ
φ
∂q∗i (k)
∂k
[
(φ− τm(q∗(k)))(ϕv − q∗i (k))− 2γ(q∗i (k)− ϕm)2(ϕv − ϕm)
]
. (6)
As k increases within
[
k¯/4, k¯
]
, the term (φ − τm(q∗(k)))(ϕv − q∗i (k)) continuously
decreases while the term (q∗i (k)− ϕm)2(ϕv − ϕm) continuously increases. Therefore, the
derivative in equation (6) is decreasing in k as γ
φ
∂q∗i (k)
∂k
> 0 and
∂2q∗i (k)
∂k2
< 0. Hence, to show
that ∂W
∗
v (k)
∂k
> 0 for all k ∈ [k¯/4, k¯], it is sufficient to show that ∂Wv(k)
∂k
∣∣
k=k¯
> 0. Since by
assumption φ > γ(ϕv −ϕm)2, I replace φ = γ(ϕv −ϕm)2 and q∗i
(
k¯
)
= ϕv+3ϕm
4
in equation
(6) to obtain that
[
γ (ϕv − ϕm)2 − τm
(
q∗i
(
k¯
)
, ϕm
)] (
ϕv − q∗i
(
k¯
))− 2γ (q∗i (k¯)− ϕm)2 (ϕv − ϕm) > 0.
Therefore, the voter’s welfare Wv(k) is strictly increasing in k for every k ∈ [k¯/4, k¯].
Consider now the case where the misreporting costs are relatively high, k ≥ k¯. I
rewrite the welfare function in equation (4) by explicitly separating the expected gains
from quality,
W ∗v (k) =
(
τm(q
∗(k)) + φ
2φ
)[−γ(ϕv − q∗c (q∗i (k)))2]
+
(
1− τm(q
∗(k)) + φ
2φ
)[−γ(ϕv − q∗i (k))2]+ φ2 − τ 2m(q∗(k))4φ .
(7)
The threshold τm(q
∗(k)) = γ (2ϕm − q∗c (qi(k))− q∗i (k)) (q∗c (qi(k))− q∗i (k)) is positive as
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q∗i (k) > q
∗
c (qi(k)) ≥ ϕm for every finite k ≥ k¯. I write the derivative ∂τm(q
∗(k))
∂k
as
∂τm(q
∗(k))
∂k
= γ
[(
−∂q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k))
∂k
− ∂q
∗
i (k)
∂k
)
(q∗c (q
∗
i (k))− q∗i (k))
+ (2ϕm − q∗c (q∗i (k))− q∗i (k))
(
∂q∗c (q
∗
i (k))
∂k
− ∂q
∗
i (k)
∂k
)]
=
γ
(q∗c (q
∗
i (k))− q∗i (k))
[(
−∂q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k))
∂k
− ∂q
∗
i (k)
∂k
)
(q∗c (q
∗
i (k))− q∗i (k))2
+ τm(q
∗(k))
(
∂q∗c (q
∗
i (k))
∂k
− ∂q
∗
i (k)
∂k
)]
< 0,
where we obtain ∂τm(q
∗(k))
∂k
< 0 because, for every finite k ≥ k¯, q∗c (q∗i (k)) < q∗i (k), ∂q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k))
∂k
>
∂q∗i (k)
∂k
> 0, τm(q
∗(k)) > 0, and
∂q∗c (q
∗
i (k))
∂k
− ∂q∗i (k)
∂k
= ξ
8γk2(ϕv−ϕm)
√
ξ
k
> 0.
Since ∂
∂k
(
τm(q∗(k))+φ
2φ
)
= 1
2φ
∂τm(q∗(k))
∂k
< 0, the probability that the challenger (in-
cumbent) wins the election decreases (increases) as k increases. Both policies q∗i (k)
and q∗c (q
∗
i (k)) increase with k ≥ k¯, with limk→∞ q∗i (k) = limk→∞ q∗c (q∗i (k)) = ϕv. Since
ϕv > q
∗
i (k) > q
∗
c (q
∗
i (k)) for every finite k ≥ k¯, the voter always prefers policy q∗i (k)
to q∗c (q
∗
i (k)). Moreover, the expected gains from quality are increasing in k since
∂
∂k
(
φ2−τ2m(q
∗(k))
4φ
)
= − τm(q∗(k))
2φ
∂τm(q∗(k))
∂k
> 0. Therefore, as k increases, the voter has
better policy proposals, a higher probability of implementing her favorite policy, and
higher expected gains from quality. It follows that, for every finite k ≥ k¯, ∂W ∗v (k)
∂k
> 0. The
proof is completed by noting from equation (4) that limk→∞W
∗
v (k) = Wˆv = φ/4.
Proof of Corollary 2. Without media outlet, the median voter theorem holds and
both candidates offer ϕv. The voter, being uninformed, cannot do better than selecting
candidates randomly given proposals q = (ϕv, ϕv). Therefore, the voter’s expected payoff
without media outlet is −γ(ϕv − ϕv)2 + Ef [θ] = 0. From Proposition 2 we have that the
welfare of the voter is at its minimum for k ∈ (0, k¯/4]. Moreover, W ∗v (k) is continuous
and increasing in k, and W ∗v (k) = −γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4 for all k ∈
(
0, k¯/4
]
. Therefore, if
−γ(ϕv − ϕm)2 + φ/4 < 0 there exists a k′ > k¯/4 such that W ∗v (k) < 0 for all k ∈ (0, k′)
and W ∗v (k) > 0 for all k > k
′.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof follows directly from maximizing ι(k) = φ−τm(q
∗(k))
2φ
with
respect to k, where q∗(k) is as in Proposition 1. Since τm(q
∗(k)) > 0 for every finite k > k¯/4
and τm(q
∗(k)) = 0 for every k ∈ (0, k¯/4], it follows that ι(k) is maximized in k ∈ (0, k¯/4],
where ι(k) = 1
2
. Moreover, since limk→∞ τm(q
∗(k)) = 0, then limk→∞ ι(k) = 1/2.
Corollary 4. The set of equilibrium payoffs that the voter can obtain in PBE robust to
the Intuitive Criterion is W(k) =
[
W ∗v (k), Wˆv
]
, where W ∗v (k) is as in equation (4) and
Wˆv = φ/4 is the full-information welfare.
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Proof. By definition, equation (4) describes the lowest payoff the voter can receive in
a PBE robust to the Intuitive Criterion. As assumed in Appendix A.2.2, suppose that
the challenger selects the voter’s least preferred policy when indifferent, and consider a
generic equilibrium of Γˆ as in Proposition 3. By the continuity of l(r) and h(r) with
respect to r, and of r∗(λ) with respect to λ, we obtain that the voter’s equilibrium
welfare is continuously (weakly) increasing in λ ∈
[
τv(q), τv(q) +
1
2
√
ξ/k
]
: for higher λ,
the set of states in which persuasion occurs (weakly) shrinks and both the incumbent
and the challenger’s policies get (weakly) closer to the voter’s bliss policy ϕv. When
λ = τv(q) +
1
2
√
ξ/k there is no persuasion at all, and the voter always elects her preferred
candidate as if under complete information. Since the media outlet has no persuasive
power, the median voter theorem holds and both candidates propose ϕv. In this case the
voter’s welfare is Wˆv = φ/4, and therefore in a PBE robust to the Intuitive Criterion the
voter can obtain any payoff in the set
[
W ∗v (k), Wˆv
]
.
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